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Abstract
Drawing on resource allocation theory, the authors examined boundary 
conditions for the positive effects of two aspects of teamwork (backing up 
behavior and performance monitoring) on team performance. Participants 
were 276 undergraduate business students who were organized into 69 teams 
and who worked on a computer simulation across multiple performance 
episodes. Approximately half the teams experienced a workload distribution 
problem. Results indicated that performance monitoring had positive effects 
on team performance when teams experienced a workload distribution 
problem. Backing up behavior had positive effects only when teams had both 
a workload distribution problem and during early performance episodes. The 
findings of this study suggest that resource allocation theory can provide 
insights regarding when members should devote and coordinate their own 
individual resources to assist others in teams. The implications of these 
findings for future theory and practice regarding teamwork are discussed.
1Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
2Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
3Ministry of National Defense, Republic of China
Corresponding Author:
Christopher O. L. H. Porter, Department of Management, Mays Business School, Texas A&M 
University, College Station, Texas 77843-4221
Email: colhp@tamu.edu
222  Small Group Research 41(2)
Keywords
teams, backing up behavior, performance monitoring, legitimacy of need
Teamwork is the collective behaviors of team members that engender a shar-
ing of information and a coordination of activities (Dickinson & McIntyre, 
1997). Although previous research largely suggests that teamwork is posi-
tively related to team effectiveness (e.g., Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 
2002), this research is not without at least three important limitations. First, 
despite the increased interest in the teamwork construct, there are multiple 
and divergent conceptualizations of teamwork. Second, there is uncertainty 
about teamwork’s dimensionality. As a result of these two limitations, we 
know little about how to theoretically and empirically distinguish different 
aspects of teamwork from one another. A third limitation stems from the 
somewhat limited perspective the extant literature has taken regarding the 
teamwork–team performance relationship. Much of this work suggests that 
teamwork has unambiguously positive effects on team performance (Mathieu, 
Gilson, & Ruddy, 2006). To date, little research has explored the boundary 
conditions under which certain types of teamwork might have less positive 
effects, no effects, or even negative effects on team performance (Mathieu, 
Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008; Porter et al., 2003).
In this article, we address these limitations by examining teamwork from 
a resource allocation perspective (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Doing so 
acknowledges that team members have scarce resources to devote to their 
teams’ tasks (Barnes et al., 2008), and suggests that some situations may be 
more appropriate than others for team members to devote their limited 
resources to engaging in teamwork. We focus specifically on two types of 
teamwork, namely backing up behavior and performance monitoring. Back-
ing up behavior is the discretionary provision of resources and task-related 
effort to another member of one’s team that is intended to help that team 
member obtain the goals as defined by his or her role (Porter et al., 2003). 
Performance monitoring is the observation and awareness of the activities 
and performance of other team members (Dickinson & McIntyre, 1997). We 
examine the role of legitimacy of need (i.e., an objective situation in which 
a team member requires the assistance of other members of the team that 
arises because of factors beyond the control of the team member who needs 
assistance, Porter et al., 2003) as a boundary condition for the effects of 
teamwork on team performance. Following Porter et al., we examine the 
existence of a workload distribution problem in teams as one indicator of 
legitimacy of need. However, we extend their work by suggesting that 
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legitimacy of need can also be thought of in terms of time and in this way, 
we take an episodic perspective (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001) to 
explore time as a boundary condition of the teamwork–team performance 
relationship. As such, our study addresses Marks et al.’s call for researchers 
to consider teams’ temporal rhythms in the measurement and evaluation of 
teamwork processes.
Figure 1 depicts our conceptual model. Below, we develop the hypotheses 
implied by the model and test them among a sample of teams composed of 
undergraduate business students who worked on a computerized, decision-
making task in a laboratory setting. The task was characterized by high levels 
of task and outcome interdependence. Members worked together in a common 
room where, although they could not see each other’s computers, they could 
verbally communicate with one another. In this way, the teams used in our 
study were similar to the same-time, same-place meeting virtual project 
teams that are used by a number of contemporary work organizations (e.g., 
military, financial, and technology teams; Mittleman & Briggs, 1999). Our 
teams were randomly assigned to one of two conditions; groups either expe-
rienced a workload distribution problem or they did not. Groups then worked 
on the task over two separate performance episodes, which allowed us to 
compare the effects of their engaging in the teamwork processes on their 









Figure 1. The moderating role of legitimacy of need on the effects of backing up 
behavior and performance monitoring on team performance
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Teamwork: Backing Up Behavior 
and Performance Monitoring
Scholars have proposed many teamwork taxonomies (e.g., Dickinson & 
McIntyre, 1997; McIntyre & Salas, 1995). Marks et al. (2001) provided the 
most recent and comprehensive taxonomy. What they refer to as action 
processes (i.e., monitoring progress toward goals, system monitoring, coor-
dination, performance monitoring, and backing up behaviors) are the activities 
in which teams engage that are directly related to goal accomplishment. Thus, 
they are especially important in teams. For example, Marks et al. argued that 
performance monitoring and backing up behavior are especially critical to 
team effectiveness because “if teammates are not looking out for, or willing 
to help out, each other, the team will fail when any one member fails” (p. 367). 
These specific action processes are also important because they enable 
teams to continuously improve and adapt to the unexpected (Kozlowski & 
Ilgen, 2006).
Backing up behavior and performance monitoring have been found to be 
positively related to social and task performance in teams (Marks et al., 2002; 
Marks & Panzer, 2004; Porter, 2005; Porter et al., 2003). Backing up behav-
ior has positive effects on team performance because it helps other members 
develop role-relevant knowledge and skills and because when team mem-
bers engage in backing up behavior they help correct mistakes that other 
members have made (Porter, 2005). When teams engage in performance mon-
itoring, members observe the actions of their teammates and watch for errors 
or performance discrepancies (Marks & Panzer, 2004). Thus, performance 
monitoring helps members prevent other members from making mistakes 
that may negatively affect the team’s performance as a whole. In addition, 
performance monitoring helps members anticipate each other’s needs and 
learn each other’s strengths and weaknesses which should, in turn, provide 
opportunities for members to help each other learn how to better perform their 
individual tasks.
Similarities and Differences Between Backing 
Up Behavior and Performance Monitoring
Backing up behavior and performance monitoring are similar in that both are 
focused on others’ performance (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Marks et al., 
2001). Although backing up behavior and performance monitoring may be 
positively related, they are not always associated with each other. For exam-
ple, members may make a point to monitor each other’s performance; however, 
they may not do anything to actually help another member who is struggling. 
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In some cases, teams may make a conscious decision to let a struggling 
member fend for him or herself. Alternatively, members may not provide 
assistance even when they are aware of a team member’s need for it because 
of an inability to help or a lack of time due to unwillingness to neglect other 
tasks, including their own. Similarly, members can provide backing up behav-
iors with or without performance monitoring. Backing up behavior may be 
initiated because members are monitoring each other’s performance and 
recognize that one of them is struggling. However, it may also be provided 
simply because a team member requests it. Backing up behavior may also be 
provided when members simply want to be helpful or have the ability to 
assist another member yet that member has little need for assistance. Marks 
et al. (2001) suggested that the latter situation is likely to leave a team sus-
ceptible and vulnerable.
Of particular importance here is that backing up behavior and performance 
monitoring are different because they each require different types and amounts 
of resources. Backing up behavior requires that members have an awareness 
of other members’ roles and be willing and able to provide and seek assis-
tance. Backing up behavior therefore requires team members to allocate both 
cognitive and behavioral resources to each other (Marks et al., 2001). Perfor-
mance monitoring, on the other hand, involves regular observation and a 
concern with the performance of teammates (Serfaty, Entin, & Johnston, 
1998). As such, it requires team members to devote only cognitive resources 
to each other (Marks et al., 2001). For example, when teams engage in perfor-
mance monitoring, members use cognitive resources to stay informed about 
others’ performance. When teams engage in backing up behavior, members 
actually intervene and help one another perform their individual tasks (Porter 
et al., 2003), thus devoting cognitive and physical resources to each other.
Consistent with Figure 1, of particular interest here are contingencies (i.e., 
moderators) of the effects of these two types of teamwork on team perfor-
mance. As such, we neither make specific predictions about their direct effects 
on team performance, nor do we make specific predictions about the direct 
effects of our moderators on team performance. Instead, we develop predic-
tions regarding potential moderators of the effects of backing up behavior 
and performance monitoring by first framing the decision to engage in each 
as a resource allocation decision.
Reframing Backing Up and Performance Monitoring 
as Resource Allocation Decisions
Resource allocation theory (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989) proposes that indi-
viduals have limited (i.e., scarce) amounts of attentional resources to devote 
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to a task (i.e., resource limitations). According to the theory, a task is resource-
limited when increases or decreases in the amount of attention devoted to that 
task result in changes in objective task performance. With resource-limited 
tasks, as resources are allocated toward performing one function, fewer 
resources will be available and allocated to other functions.
A number of scholars have extended Kanfer and Ackerman’s (1989) 
resource allocation theory to the team level, primarily to make the distinction 
between taskwork and teamwork (e.g., Bowers, Braun, & Morgan, 1997). 
Taskwork is “a team’s interactions with tasks, tools, and machines and 
includes those efforts traditionally associated with individual task perfor-
mance” (Bowers et al., 1997, p. 90). Taskwork is critical for all team tasks as 
members need a certain amount of requisite skills for their team to perform 
well. Teamwork refers to the “interpersonal interactions among individual 
team members that are necessary for exchanging information, developing 
and maintaining communication patterns, and coordination” (Bowers et al., 
1997, p. 90). In other words, taskwork refers to what teams are doing and 
teamwork refers to how they are doing it (Marks et al., 2002).
Extending resource allocation theory, scholars have suggested that teams 
are resource-limited because they often have finite resources and capacities 
to perform their taskwork and teamwork roles (Barnes et al., 2008). In other 
words, team settings usually require team members to allocate their limited 
resources between taskwork and teamwork. For example, Bowers et al. (1997) 
suggested that team performance environments are dual paradigms in which 
efforts devoted toward teamwork must be balanced with efforts devoted 
toward taskwork (see also Glickman et al., 1987 and Morgan, Salas, & 
Glickman, 1993, who provided empirical evidence supporting both the 
distinction between taskwork and teamwork and their competing nature). 
When team members devote attention to teamwork, they must divert atten-
tion from taskwork. Indeed, if team members are unskilled at coordinating 
their efforts, they will be forced to devote increased attention to teamwork, 
which drains from the pool of resources that could be devoted to taskwork. In 
addition, team members’ inability to effectively coordinate their efforts could 
potentially create a distraction in the team, thus decreasing attention devoted 
to taskwork.
Consistent with this extension of resource allocation theory, we pro-
pose that as a team’s members devote more of their resources to teamwork, 
they will have fewer resources available to devote to taskwork. Following 
Porter et al. (2003), we recognize that because work activities and demands 
often vary across individuals within a team and because teams vary on the 
extent to which coordinated effort is required of team members, teams also 
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vary on the extent to which teamwork is necessary to successfully perform. 
We therefore suggest that teams can and should make decisions regarding 
how much of their resources they devote to teamwork. Next, we discuss two 
potential moderators of the effects of our two teamwork processes on team 
performance—moderators that we believe capture the extent to which there 
is an objective need to devote their resources to teamwork and what we col-
lectively refer to as a legitimate need for teamwork.
Legitimacy of Need for Teamwork
Teams are, by nature, collections of interdependent individuals who share 
responsibility for specific outcomes (Sundstrom, De Meuse, & Futrell, 1990). 
Therefore, team members typically rely on one another for successful goal 
accomplishment; the higher their levels of task interdependence, the more 
likely they are to engage in teamwork and other forms of cooperation (Allen, 
Sargent, & Bradley, 2003; Katz-Navon & Erez, 2005). However, even among 
highly interdependent tasks, there may be a more or less legitimate need for 
engaging in teamwork. Schwartz and Fleishman (1978) defined legitimacy 
of need as the specific nature of a need that affects helping behavior. Porter 
et al. (2003) extended this definition to team settings and suggested that legit-
imacy of need can be defined as an objective situation that requires assistance 
from other members of one’s team and that arises because of factors beyond 
the control of the team member who needs the assistance. Somewhat related, 
Tyler (2006) defined legitimacy as a “property of an authority, institution 
or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe that it is 
appropriate, proper and just” (p. 375), which suggests that legitimacy of need 
can be conceptualized as either subjective or objective. Following Porter et al. 
(2003), we conceptualize legitimacy of need as an objective property and we 
explore the potential moderating role of two indicators of legitimacy of need 
on the teamwork–team performance relationship.
Workload Distribution Problem as Legitimacy of Need
The individual workloads placed on members within a team can take various 
forms. In some situations, individual team members’ workloads are identical; 
however in other situations, individual team members’ workloads may vary. 
Porter et al. (2003) explicitly focused on situations in which members of the 
same team have different workloads and suggested that teams face a workload 
distribution problem (and thus a legitimate need for teamwork) when one of 
their members has individual demands that exceed his or her individual 
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resources. Teams have no such problem (and thus no legitimate need for 
teamwork) when members have sufficient or excess resources to meet dis-
proportionately heavy individual task demands. Porter et al. found that 
workload distribution problems were associated with higher levels of backing 
up in teams. Somewhat related, Barnes et al. (2008) found that workload 
distribution problems in teams were negatively related to team performance. 
We therefore predict that when teams have a workload distribution problem, 
engaging in teamwork should increase team performance. We do not expect 
to see the same benefits from engaging in teamwork when teams do not have 
a workload distribution problem. This suggests the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between backing up behavior and team 
performance will be moderated by workload distribution problems 
such that there will be a more positive effect for backing up 
behaviors on team performance when there is a workload distribu-
tion problem than when there is no workload distribution problem.
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between performance monitoring and 
team performance will be moderated by workload distribution prob-
lems such that there will be a more positive effect for performance 
monitoring on team performance when there is a workload distribu-
tion problem than when there is no workload distribution problem.
Time as Legitimacy of Need
Among the many calls that have been made to team scholars, perhaps no other 
has remained as unanswered as the call for their models of team behavior to 
explicitly consider the role of time (Mathieu et al., 2008; McGrath, 1990). In 
their review, Kozlowski and Bell (2003) discussed how few theoretical 
models currently exist that make serious efforts to incorporate time. Indeed, 
much of the empirical work on teams has tended to include data collected at 
one point in time, thus prohibiting a better understanding of how the effects 
of teamwork may differ from one performance episode to another (Marks 
et al., 2001; Mathieu et al., 2008). In this study, we take an episodic perspective 
(e.g., DeChurch & Haas, 2008; Marks et al., 2001), and examine the possibil-
ity that teamwork behaviors that are functional during early performance 
episodes may prove to be less functional during later performance episodes.
We expect that teamwork should help compensate for a lack of taskwork 
skills during early performance episodes. However, we also believe that as 
taskwork skills increase as one might expect they should over time, the redun-
dancy that teamwork creates in the presence of increased taskwork skills will 
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attenuate the relationship between teamwork and team performance. In other 
words, when team members continue to devote their individual resources to 
other team members whose taskwork skills have improved over time, the 
team members who are providing their individual resources to others may be 
forced to neglect their own roles and responsibilities. When these team mem-
bers neglect their own roles and responsibilities it can hurt their team’s 
performance. Therefore, we expect that compared with early performance 
episodes, the effects of teamwork on team performance during later perfor-
mance episode may be less positive.
It is important to recall that compared with performance monitoring, 
backing up behavior is a more costly type of teamwork because backing up 
behavior requires the provision of both cognitive and physical resources 
whereas performance monitoring is primarily a cognitive activity and only 
requires cognitive resources (Marks et al., 2001). Over time, we expect that 
the high levels of cognitive and physical resources required for teams to 
engage in backing up behavior will come at the expense of resources that 
could be devoted to taskwork. We do not expect that engaging in perfor-
mance monitoring will drain resources that could be devoted to taskwork to 
the same extent as engaging in backing up behavior. Therefore, we predict 
that the relationship between backing up behavior and team performance 
should decrease over time, but this will not be the case for performance 
monitoring. Because we do not want to hypothesize a null effect for time as 
it relates to performance monitoring, we make only the following and final 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The interactive effects of backing up behavior and work-
load distribution problems will depend on time such that there will 
be a less positive effect for backing up behaviors on team perfor-
mance for teams with a workload distribution problem over time.
Method
Participants
Participants were 276 undergraduate business students at a southern univer-
sity who were enrolled in a management course; students were divided into 69 
teams consisting of 4 students each. A total of 59.8% of the participants were 
women. In all, 15.9% of the participants were seniors, 83.7% were juniors, 
and 0.4% were sophomores. Most of the participants (87.3%) were White/
Caucasian. Participation in the study was voluntary and participants received 
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extra course credit in addition to the opportunity to win a $100 cash prize 
based on their team’s task performance.
Research Task
Participants worked on a modified version of the Distributed Dynamic 
Decision-Making (DDD) Simulation developed for the Department of Defense 
for research and training purposes (Miller, Young, Kleinman, & Serfaty, 
1998). The version of the simulation used in this study could be worked on 
by participants with little to no military experience yet it was still relatively 
complex (Hollenbeck et al., 2002; Porter, 2005). DDD simulates a military 
command and control situation in which team members work interdepen-
dently to protect an on-screen geographic area (i.e., a no-fly zone) from 
enemy targets (i.e., tracks). The no-fly zone is partitioned into two areas, 
each of which is restricted; however, one of the areas is more highly restricted 
than the other. The two restricted areas are each further partitioned into four 
sections, or quadrants, and each team member is assigned primary responsi-
bility for one of these quadrants.
During the task, a number of tracks enter the no-fly zone and attempt to 
travel through its restricted and highly restricted areas. Teams are instructed 
to protect their restricted areas by disabling (i.e., destroying) enemy tracks 
that enter the restricted areas while at the same time avoiding the destruction 
of any friendly tracks. To accomplish their mission, teams are given several 
resources (i.e., tanks, helicopters, jets, and radar planes) to help them monitor 
and protect the restricted areas; the allocation of these resources in this study 
is described below under Workload Distribution Problem. Each team member 
controlled a base, which was located in the center of his or her quadrant, from 
which he or she could deploy individual resources. These resources, along 
with the base, were used to detect the presence or absence of tracks. Once 
tracks were detected, members used their base and resources to identify 
the tracks (i.e., determine whether the track was friendly or enemy and deter-
mine which resources were necessary to destroy any enemy tracks). Members 
then used their resources to destroy any enemy tracks that were in the restricted 
areas, hence the defensive nature of the task. To defend the entire area, mem-
bers had to verbally communicate and discuss the location of the tracks on 
the screen (no one team member could see all of the screen and all of the 
tracks), make decisions regarding which tracks to destroy or ignore, and coor-
dinate their resources; hence there were high levels of task interdependence 
among team members. To the extent that the teams made accurate decisions 
regarding whether or not to destroy potentially threatening tracks and 
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executed those decisions quickly, they received higher scores on the task (see 
Hollenbeck et al., 2002, for a more complete description of the task).
Procedures
On entering the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned both to a 
four-person work team and one of the four computer stations (i.e., the DM1, 
DM2, DM3, or DM4 station). Each team was then randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental conditions—workload distribution problem or no 
workload distribution problem. Participants then received declarative and 
procedural training that lasted for approximately 1 hour. At the end of the 
training, teams were allowed to practice on the task for 10 minutes. Partici-
pants then worked on two similar 30-minute trials (i.e., during each task teams 
encountered and had to deal with the same number and type of tracks). Back-
ing up behavior and team performance were measured during each of the two 
tasks. Performance monitoring was measured at the end of each of the two 
tasks. On completion of the second task and the second administration of 
the performance monitoring measure, team members were debriefed and 
dismissed.
Manipulations and Measures
Workload distribution problem. All of the teams worked in a task environ-
ment in which only DM2 had a disproportionately heavy share of the team’s 
workload. We ensured this by programming the task such that the restricted 
and highly restricted areas for which DM2 had primary responsibility were 
the ones in which the majority of the enemy tracks entered the screen. Thus, 
although all team members had to monitor their restricted airspace and pre-
vent enemy tracks from entering the restricted areas by detecting the presence 
of tracks, identifying them as friendly or enemy, and destroying enemy tracks 
when necessary, DM2 had considerably more of these tracks to detect, iden-
tify, and destroy. Consistent with our conceptualization of a workload 
distribution problem as the intersection of task demands and the availability 
of resources to manage those demands, we manipulated the presence or 
absence of a workload distribution problem by varying the allocation of 
resources within the teams—resources that varied in terms of power and 
capabilities. In the workload distribution problem (WDP) condition, DM2 
was given the same resources as his or her teammates (one tank, one helicop-
ter, one jet, and one radar plane). Thus, while experiencing a high workload 
(i.e., excess demands) relative to his or her teammates, DM2s in the WDP 
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condition did not have the necessary resources to manage their workloads. 
In the no workload distribution problem (No WDP) condition, DM2 was 
given all four tanks, which were the most powerful of the team’s resources. 
Therefore, even though a DM2 in this condition had excess demands relative 
to his or her teammates, he or she also had the resources necessary to manage 
this workload effectively without assistance. It should be noted, however, that 
regardless of the condition our teams were randomly assigned into, every 
team had a total of 16 resources and every team member had 4 resources. 
Thus, the only difference between the teams assigned to the two conditions 
was the allocation of the types of resources among the teams’ members. Our 
conceptualization and operationalization of WDP was consistent with Porter 
et al. (2003) who also examined WDPs in teams. We dummy-coded our 
experimental conditions 0 for No WDP and 1 for WDP; this experimental 
manipulation was a between-team factor.
Team performance. Team performance was measured by the computer 
simulation and was based on the teams’ defensive performance consistent 
with the task mission. Each team began each task with 50,000 defensive 
points and lost 1 point for each second that any enemy track was in the 
restricted areas and 2 points for each second that any enemy track was in the 
highly restricted areas. Because of the nature of the task, high defensive per-
formance scores at the end of the 30-minute tasks were indicative of higher 
levels of performance. Team performance was measured during both perfor-
mance episodes (i.e., at Time 1 and Time 2) and, as such, was a within-team 
factor.
Backing up behavior. Backing up behavior was measured objectively at the 
team level using the same procedure employed in Porter et al. (2003) and 
captured the extent to which team members other than DM2 provided assis-
tance in terms of clearing enemy tracks from the DM2 quadrant. For instance, 
if DM1, DM3, or DM4 attacked and cleared an enemy track that was residing 
in either the restrictive or highly restrictive areas that were the primary 
responsibility of DM2, it was counted as an instance of backing up behavior. 
Backing up behavior was measured during both performance episodes (i.e., 
at Time 1 and Time 2) and was a within-team factor.
Performance monitoring. Performance monitoring was measured with a five-
item scale created for this study and measured the extent to which team 
members monitored each other’s performance during the task. All the items 
were measured on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
The items were as follows: “The members of my team monitored each other’s 
performances,” “The members of my team were aware of what other team 
members were doing,” “The members of my team knew how other team 
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members were performing,” “The members of my team inquired into how 
each other were doing,” and “The members of my team made a point to check 
on each other.” Mean scores were used to aggregate team members’ perfor-
mance monitoring to the team level of analysis. As with team performance 
and backing up behavior, performance monitoring was also measured at 
Time 1 and Time 2 and was a within-team factor. Because our performance 
monitoring items were based on a referent-shift composition model (Chan, 
1998), we calculated rwg(j), ICC(1), ICC(2), and F tests (ICC = intraclass 
correlation coefficient) to determine whether there was justification for aggre-
gating individual performance monitoring perceptions to the team level. 
Results of these analyses revealed high levels of within-team agreement and 
reliability in addition to more between team variance than within team vari-
ance on this variable both for Time 1, rwg = .83, ICC(1) = .28, ICC(2) = .61, 
F(68, 207) = 2.56, p < .01 and Time 2, rwg = .84, ICC(1) = .35, ICC(2) = .69, 
F(68, 207) = 3.20, p < .01. Table 1 presents an overview of each of the vari-
ables and their method of measurement.
Results
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations 
for all the study variables. Although positive as expected, the correlation 
between backing up behavior and performance monitoring was not significant 
at either Time 1, r = .18, p = nonsignificant (ns), or Time 2, r = .14, p = ns. 
It is also worth noting that almost half of our teams were structured so that 
they might better manage their workload distribution whereas the rest were 
not. Accordingly, this attenuated the relationship between WDP and team 
performance in the zero-order correlation table.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of the two hierarchical regressions used 
to test Hypotheses 1 through 3. Table 3 presents the results at Time 1. Table 4 
presents the results at Time 2. Support for our hypotheses would be demon-
strated if we found evidence of a significant two-way interaction between 
backing up behavior and WDP at Time 1 but not at Time 2, and if we found 
evidence of a significant two-way interaction between performance monitor-
ing and WDP at both Time 1 and Time 2.
Turning first to the results at Time 1, as can be seen in Step 1 of Table 3, 
there were significant effects on team performance for both backing up and 
performance monitoring, b = .27, p < .10 and b = .32, p < .01, respectively. 
As can be seen in Step 2, a WDP had a negative effect on team performance, 
b = -.38, p < .01. Finally, as can be seen in Step 3 of Table 3, there was a 
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and WDP, b = 1.03, p < .10 and between performance monitoring and WDP, 
b = 1.16, p < .10, as expected.
Turning next to the results at Time 2, we ran the same hierarchical regres-
sion as we did for Time 1 but with the data collected at Time 2. As can be seen 
in Step 1 of Table 4, only performance monitoring had a significant effect on 
Table 2. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero Order Correlations
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6
1. Team performance 35719.91 5353.66       
 (Time 1)
2. Team performance 39339.75 4028.17 .70**      
 (Time 2)
3. Workload distribution 0.51 0.50 -.10 -.19    
 problem (WDP)a
4. Backing up behaviors 13.94 4.33 .27* .09 .57** —   
 (Time 1)
5. Backing up behaviors 14.68 4.33 .01 -.06 .76** .76** — 
 (Time 2)
6. Performance 3.69 0.60 .35** .28* .11 .18 .18 — 
 monitoring (Time 1)
7. Performance 3.87 0.52 .27* .33** .06 .16 .14 .88** 
 monitoring (Time 2)
Note: N = 69.
a. Workload distribution problem was dummy coded 0 = no workload distribution problem and 1 = workload 
distribution problem.
*p < .05. ** p < .01.
Table 3. Moderated Regression Analyses: Predicting Team Performance at Time 1
 Time 1 Team Performance
Step and Variables b	 R2 DR2 DF
Step 1
Backing up behavior 0.27* .21** .18 6.60***
Performance monitoring 0.32***   
Step 2
Workload distribution problem (WDP) -0.38*** .26 .08 8.55***
Step 3
Backing up behavior × WDP 1.03* .33 .07 2.88*
Performance monitoring × WDP 1.16*   
Note: N = 69.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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team performance at Time 2, b = .35, p < .01. As can be seen in Step 2, a 
WDP again had a significant negative effect on team performance, b = -.30, 
p < .01. As seen in Step 3, as expected, we did not find evidence of a two-way 
interaction between backing up behavior and WDP, b = -.71, p = ns, but we 
did find evidence of a two-way interaction between performance monitoring 
and WDP, b = 1.95, p < .05.
We plotted the interactions from our hierarchical regressions following 
Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken’s (2003) suggested use of regression slopes 
for low (-1 standard deviation) and high (+1 standard deviation) levels of the 
predictors around their means. We also conducted a test of the simple slopes 
following Aiken and West (1991) to further analyze the nature of the interac-
tions. Figure 2 depicts our findings regarding backing up behavior. For teams 
with a WDP, as backing up behavior increased, so did team performance at 
Time 1. Backing up behavior had no effects on team performance when teams 
did not have a WDP as also seen in the top half of the figure. Our results 
regarding the role of time clarify this two-way interaction. As seen in the 
bottom half of the figure, backing up behavior had virtually no effect on team 
performance at Time 2, regardless of whether or not teams had a WDP. Thus, 
the interactive effect of backing up behavior and WDP depended on time as 
suggested by Hypothesis 3. The results of the simple slope test revealed that 
there was, in fact, a significant difference between the effects of backing up 
behavior and team performance among teams with a WDP at Time 1 and the 
effects of backing up behavior and team performance among teams with a 
WDP at Time 2, t(134) = -2.24, p < .05.
Also as hypothesized, performance monitoring followed a very differ-
ent pattern as can be seen in Figure 3. Performance monitoring had a more 
Table 4. Moderated Regression Analyses: Predicting Team Performance at Time 2
 Time 2 Team Performance
Step and Variables b	 R2 DR2 DF
Step 1
Backing up behavior -0.11 .12** .12 4.59***
Performance monitoring 0.35***   
Step 2
Workload distribution problem (WDP) -0.30*** .16 .04 3.05*
Step 3
Backing up behavior × WDP -0.71 .23 .07 2.62*
Performance monitoring × WDP 1.95**   
N = 69.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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positive effect on team performance when teams had a WDP than when 
teams did not have a WDP at Time 1 as seen in the top half of Figure 3. As 
seen in the bottom half of Figure 3, the positive effects of performance mon-
itoring on team performance among teams with a WDP at Time 2 were 
consistent with those found at Time 1, therefore time had no influence on the 
effects of performance monitoring. The simple slope test revealed no sig-













































Figure 2. Interactive effects between backing up behavior and workload 
distribution problem (WDP) on team performance over time
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performance for teams with a WDP at Time 1 compared with Time 2, t(134) = 
-.74, p = ns.
Supplemental Analysis
To provide a more direct test of our hypotheses regarding time, we also ran a 













































Figure 3. Interactive effects between performance monitoring and workload 
distribution problem (WDP) on team performance over time
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design we employed was based on both between-team (i.e., workload distri-
bution problem) and within-team (i.e., backing up behavior, performance 
monitoring, and team performance) factors (see Table 1). To conduct this 
analysis, we created an additional variable that represented time, which was 
dummy coded 0 for Time 1 and 1 for Time 2.
The results of the supplemental analysis can be seen in Table 5. Backing up 
behavior and performance monitoring (Step 1) explained a significant amount 
of variance in team performance, DR2 = .15, F(2, 135) = 11.68, p < .01. Time 
(Step 2) also had a positive effect on team performance, b = .30, p < .01, indi-
cating that team performance increased over time. The two two-way interactions 
between time and our teamwork variables (Step 3) did not explain a significant 
portion of the variance in team performance, DR2 = .02, DF(2, 132) = 2.09, 
p = ns, even though the interaction of backing up behavior and time was sig-
nificant, b = -.56, p < .01. Experiencing a WDP had a negative effect on team 
performance, b = -.34, p < .01, as seen in Step 4.
Of particular interest is Step 5, where it can be seen that as a set our three 
two-way interactions explained a significant portion of the variance in team 
performance, DR2 = .04, DF(3, 128) = 2.94, p < .05. The interaction between 
backing up behavior and WDP was not significant, b = .47, p = ns, nor was 
the interaction between time and WDP, b = .08, p = ns. However, the interac-
tion between performance monitoring and WDP was, b = 1.36, p < .01.
Also of particular interest is Step 6, which tested our hypothesis that the 
two-way interaction between backing up behavior and WDP would be further 
explained by time. Although we also included an additional three-way inter-
action representing the interaction between performance monitoring, WDP, 
and time, we did not predict that this interaction would be significant. Adding 
this interaction provided a more complete regression and it also served as a 
comparison to the three-way interaction that included backing up behavior. 
As can be seen in Step 6, as a set the two three-way interactions did not explain 
a significant amount of variance in team performance, DR2 = .01, DF(2, 126) = 
1.44, p = ns. However, the interaction among backing up behavior, WDP, and 
time was marginally significant, b = -1.48, p < .10. As expected, the three-
way interaction between performance monitoring, WDP, and time was not 
significant, b = .24, p = ns. These results are completely consistent with our 
hypotheses and hierarchical regressions.
Discussion
The main purpose of this study was to examine the moderating role of WDPs 
and time—which we argued both serve as indicators of legitimacy of need 
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for teamwork—on the commonly assumed positive effects of backing up 
behavior and performance monitoring on team performance. We drew from 
resource allocation theory to both distinguish between these two types of 
teamwork and to develop predictions regarding the moderating role of each 
indicator of legitimacy of need. In this way, our study fills several gaps in the 
teamwork literature, which has devoted limited empirical attention to distin-
guishing among the various types of teamwork, assumed that teamwork has 
unambiguously positive effects on team performance, and failed to system-
atically explore how the effects of teamwork on team performance may 
change over time (Mathieu et al., 2008).
The results of this study suggest that the legitimacy of need for teamwork 
is an important factor that should be considered in making predictions about 
when engaging in different types of teamwork behaviors will benefit teams 
the most. In this study, when teams were not faced with a legitimate need for 
teamwork in terms of a WDP neither backing up behaviors nor performance 
monitoring had effects on team performance. When teams were faced with a 
WDP, monitoring each other’s performance was positively associated with 
Table 5. Results of Repeated Measures Regression: Predicting Team Performance
Step and Variables b	 R2 DR2 DF
Step 1
Backing up behavior 0.09 .15 .15*** 11.68***
Performance monitoring 0.36***   
Step 2
Time 0.30*** .24 .09*** 15.64***
Step 3
Backing up behavior × Time -0.56** .26 .02 2.09
Performance monitoring × Time -0.05   
Step 4
Workload distribution problem (WDP) -0.34*** .32 .06*** 12.19***
Step 5
Backing up behavior × WDP 0.47 .37 .04** 2.94**
Performance monitoring × WDP 1.36***   
Time × WDP 0.08   
Step 6
Backing up behavior × WDP × Time -1.48* .38 .01 1.44
Performance monitoring × WDP × Time 0.24   
N = 138.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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increased team performance. The findings regarding backing up behavior 
were more complex. Backing up behavior was positively associated with team 
performance when teams were faced with a WDP, but this was only the case 
during early performance episodes. The results lend support to our contention 
that as teams work together over time, which presumably increases members’ 
taskwork skills, backing up behaviors become less functional. The results 
are consistent with those of Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, Salas, and Cannon-
Bowers (2000), who examined team processes and showed that although 
team processes generally improved over time, team performance did not. The 
results of our study suggest that even though teams may engage in certain 
teamwork processes over time, those processes will not necessarily improve 
team performance.
The results also support our contention that the decision to engage in team-
work is ultimately a resource allocation decision by which members must 
decide how to best allocate their limited resources, either toward taskwork or 
toward teamwork. Moreover, the findings lend support to the notion that task-
work and teamwork may be somewhat supplementary skills. In this regard, 
our study makes a significant contribution to the team literature that has gen-
erally assumed that taskwork and teamwork skills are relatively complementary, 
so much so that the distinction between the two may diminish over time 
(Bowers et al., 1997; Morgan et al., 1993). We would argue that during early 
performance episodes, teamwork may compensate for a lack of taskwork 
skills among a team’s members. However, as teams perform over time and 
across multiple episodes, some teamwork behaviors may have more limited 
effects on overall team performance when there is an increase in members’ 
taskwork skills.
Finally, our study provides insights regarding the dimensionality of the 
teamwork construct. Scholars have proposed a number of teamwork taxono-
mies (e.g., Marks et al., 2001; McIntyre & Salas, 1995). These taxonomies 
vary in the extent to which they distinguish between the different aspects of 
teamwork. For example, the taxonomy proposed by Marks et al. (2001) sug-
gests that performance monitoring and backing up behavior are conceptually 
similar and Marks and her colleagues lump the two behavioral processes 
together into a single operational definition. The results of this study suggest 
that although conceptually similar, different types of teamwork can and should 
be distinguished from one other in future theory and research.
Practical Implications
Our findings suggest a number of practical implications, in particular for 
highly interdependent project teams. Because we found that legitimacy of 
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need is an important factor determining when teamwork behaviors have their 
intended effects on team performance, we recommend that managers and 
team leaders encourage employees to carefully consider whether engaging in 
higher levels of different types of teamwork will ultimately result in better 
team performance. Related to this recommendation, high levels of interde-
pendence imply that engaging in at least some teamwork is required. However, 
we argued that members’ decisions to engage in different types of teamwork 
and at different levels is a conscious decision. Our findings suggest that these 
decisions have performance implications. Although limited, there is at least 
some evidence suggesting that managers and team leaders can intentionally 
staff their teams so that they will be more likely to make better decisions 
about when to request and when to provide certain forms of teamwork. 
For example, Porter et al. (2003) reported that high levels of conscientious-
ness and emotional stability were associated with a decreased tendency to 
receive backing up behavior from others when there was not a legitimate 
need for it. They also found that low levels of emotional stability were associ-
ated with members’ failure to provide backing up behavior even when there 
was a legitimate need for it. Thus, it appears that managers and team leaders 
might be able to use personality characteristics to staff teams that will make 
more prudent decisions regarding whether or not to engage in increased levels 
of teamwork.
Another potential leverage point for ensuring that teams make appropriate 
decisions about when to engage in greater levels of teamwork is team training. 
We recommend against simplistic teamwork training that promotes the idea 
that engaging in greater levels of teamwork is always the most appropriate 
means for teams to overcome obstacles. We are not arguing against team-
work training or teamwork skills training. On the contrary, such training is 
especially important given our findings, but these findings suggest several 
requirements that managers and team leaders should look for in this training. 
Teamwork training should focus specifically on helping team members rec-
ognize legitimate needs for teamwork. It should also clarify the varying costs 
of different types of teamwork. Finally, teamwork training should also make 
clear the potential negative implications of engaging in various types of team-
work behaviors on members’ own individual ability to engage in taskwork 
and the implications of providing too much assistance to others in their teams 
(e.g., social loafing or not providing sufficient opportunities for other team 
members to develop their own taskwork skills).
Related to this, our findings also suggest an additional benefit of ensuring 
that team members are trained together in addition to being trained individu-
ally. Previous work on the development of transactive memory systems in 
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teams has suggested that it is team training, as opposed to individual training, 
that is critical for effectiveness because it is through team training that mem-
bers learn who knows what (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Moreland & 
Myaskovsky, 2000). By training members together, members learn who has 
deficiencies in terms of individual expertise that might be needed for the 
team to be successful. Such training therefore has the potential to help mem-
bers develop a better sense of whether or not there will be a legitimate need 
for teamwork once the team begins working together.
Limitations
Despite the insight our study provides, there are some limitations that should 
be kept in mind. One limitation is the fact that the participants were under-
graduate students. Although the participants were relatively young, it should 
be recalled that they were similar in terms of both age and education to those 
who actually perform this very same task in military teams, which is one type 
of team and setting we noted our results could generalize. Our use of a labora-
tory context is another limitation of our study. It would be ideal to see our 
ideas tested in the field using real teams. Finally, because of their working in 
close proximity, their commitment to only one team and one team task at a 
time, and the fact that they had a considerable amount of knowledge about 
each others’ roles and responsibilities, team members in this study were likely 
more able to recognize WDPs within their teams. Not all teams in real orga-
nizations are structured such that WDPs would be so easily recognizable 
(e.g., some geographically dispersed virtual teams, project teams in which 
members are assigned to multiple teams, or when members are unwilling to 
disclose resource deficiencies). Any of these situations may give rise to 
instances in which the existence of a WDP may not be as clear as was the case 
in our study.
Future Research Directions
Our findings clearly indicate that more attention should be devoted to under-
standing when teams have a more or less legitimate need for teamwork. 
Admittedly, there are other aspects of legitimacy of need for teamwork that 
we did not consider, but that are ripe for research. For example, teams may 
have a more legitimate need for teamwork when new team members replace 
more senior team members, when they face a new and unfamiliar task, or 
when their task environment changes substantially. Teams may continue to 
have a legitimate need for teamwork over time when team members fail to 
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develop increased taskwork skills. We suggest that future effort toward theory 
development be aimed at providing a broader, more complete understanding 
of legitimacy of need as it relates to teamwork.
We also suggest that future research explore WDPs more broadly. We 
focused specifically on one type of WDP where one team member had a 
disproportionately heavy share of their team’s overall workload yet did not 
have the resources necessary to manage this excess workload. However, 
because WDPs arise whenever individual team members have task demands 
that exceed the resources they individually possess, there are other situations 
that also lead to WDPs in teams. For example, a newly added team member 
who lacks the skills and/or experience to handle his or her share of an evenly 
shared team workload could create a WDP for a team. Thus, future research 
needs to explore other types of WDPs in teams and how teams can best 
respond to them.
We should also mention that the task used in this study was one in which 
across the two performance episodes, the demands placed on teams were 
held constant. As a result, there were no significant differences in the task 
from Time 1 to Time 2 so it is reasonable to conclude that generally members’ 
taskwork skills increased over time. Although this is consistent with many 
actual teams in real organizations, it is likely that our results would not hold 
with teams working on tasks that are constantly changing or when, over time, 
team members are continuing to develop new taskwork skills. Future research 
should examine the teamwork–team performance relationship over time 
across a broad range of team tasks including those in which task demands are 
not held constant. Somewhat related, as teams develop very high levels of 
taskwork skills, they may be able to devote attention toward teamwork with-
out taskwork suffering. This implies that it may be the case that teamwork 
and taskwork are both complementary and supplementary over time. This 
would also be an interesting area for future research; however, research of 
this nature would require much longer periods of time to study.
Finally, researchers seeking to explore these and related questions should 
make specific attempts to use methodologies that are not prone to social 
desirability effects. Although concerns such as these are almost always an 
issue with self-report data, given the popularity of teams and the extent to 
which contemporary organizations invest in creating team environments, it is 
easy to imagine a situation in which respondents report high levels of any 
teamwork behavior regardless of the extent to which it was actually demon-
strated. This reporting could lead to erroneous conclusions about the 
relationship between those behaviors and team performance. Future research 
should use a variety of methods and measures for studying teamwork behaviors 
and devote specific attention to developing and validating measures that have 
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utility across different types of teams that work on different types of tasks. 
For example, although our backing up behavior measure provided us with a 
precise count of the help team members provided a fellow team member that 
had a disproportionately heavy share of the team’s workload, backing up 
behavior could be measured in other ways (e.g., the nature of the resources or 
the amount of time devoted to assisting other team members).
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